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There is a comedy sketch in which a man, looking confused, knocks on
several doors in search of his appointment. When he reaches the right office,
he is pointed to his chair, which faces a second man, seated behind a large
desk and looking supremely confident. "Is this the right room for an
argument?" asks the visitor tentatively.
"I've told you once," replies the host.
"No you haven't," says the guest.
"Yes I have," repeats the host.
Eventually, the visitor breaks the chain. "Look, this isn't an argument," he
protests, earnestly.
"Yes it is," says the host.
"No it isn't, it's just contradiction," says the visitor.
"No it isn't," says the host.
This goes on, until finally the visitor interjects: "An argument is a
connected series of statements to establish a definite proposition...
contradiction is just the automatic gainsaying of anything the other person
says."
"No it isn't," answers the host, pressing a bell to signify the end of the
meeting.'
* Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law (Camden).
Visiting Professor, Comell Law School; Associate Professor of Law. Rutgers University School of
Law (Camden). A.B., Cornell University; J.D., Yale Law School. I would like to thank Michael Dorf and
Jill Fisch for their helpful comments on a previous draft of this Book Review and Myung Jae Lee. Tom
Prettyman, and Kosha Vora for outstanding research assistance.
1. The full version of this sketch appears in 2 GRAHAM CHAPMAN ET AL. TilE COMPLETE MONTry
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Dennis Patterson is here for an argument. Law and Truth,2 Patterson's
most ambitious work to date, is both an intellectual tour de force and a good,
old-fashioned street brawl. The book appears to have been modeled on the
1980s comeback tour of the boxer George Foreman, who lined up a new
opponent at each match and proceeded to knock all of them out. Patterson
devotes a chapter to each of six major schools of contemporary jurisprudence:
legal formalism, legal realism, legal positivism, and the jurisprudential theories
of Ronald Dworkin, Stanley Fish, and Philip Bobbitt. He explains why each
is seriously or fatally flawed and, in the concluding chapter, presents his own
alternative formulation. In so doing, he takes on seemingly all of the major
figures of contemporary legal thought. Yet, his conclusion-a powerful defense
of law's integrity as a social and argumentative practice-will be appealing
and even comforting to many lawyers. It is a potent rejoinder to the various
"law and" movements and, I will argue, is consistent with the emerging long-
term direction of the legal academy.
Patterson's argument is as simple as it is unique. Existing theories of
jurisprudence, ranging from law and economics to Critical Legal Studies (CLS)
to the interpretive theories of Dworkin and Fish, are deficient because they rely
on nonlegal formulas-e.g., economic efficiency, moral principles, or
contemporary literary theory-to determine the truth of propositions of law.3
In fact, Patterson argues, legal truth is not a matter of any such formulas.
Instead, truth is signified by success in the forms of legal argument, which
externally generated theories can describe or evaluate but never completely
capture. Borrowing from both the later writings of Ludwig Wittgenstein and
contemporary analytic and postmodern philosophers, Patterson describes law
as a social, argumentative practice with its own rules and integrity, rather than
as a second-order activity to be understood in the language of some other
discipline.5 To understand law, per Patterson, is to understand what lawyers
actually say and do; contemporary theories obscure or misconstrue this reality
and accordingly do more harm than good.
Described in these terms, Law and Truth is a sophisticated but somewhat
obscure theoretical tract. 6 Its practical implications, however, are striking
indeed. Patterson has written a powerful brief for what is essentially a
traditional approach to legal teaching and scholarship, an approach that takes
PYTHON'S FLYING CIRCUS: ALL THE WORDS 86-88 (Roger Wilmut ed., 1989).
2. DENNIS PATrERSON, LAW AND TRUTH (1996).
3. See id. at 181-82. A more complete description of Patterson's argument is provided infra Part 1.
4. See PAT1'ERSON, supra note 2, at 181-82.
5. See id. at 169-79.
6. For reviews emphasizing the philosophical side of Patterson's argument, see, for example, David
Bakhurst, Truth, Philosophy, and Legal Discourse, 47 U. TORONTO L.J. 395 (1997) (book review); and Ken
Kress, Modern Jurisprudence, Postmodern Jurisprudence, and Truth, 95 MICH. L. REV. 1871 (1997) (book
review). For a more extended discussion, see Law, Truth, and Interpretation: A Symposium on Dennis
Patterson's Law and Truth, 50 SMU L. REv. 1563 (1997) [hereinafter Law, Truth, and Interpretation].
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seriously conventional legal materials (cases, statutes, and so forth) and has a
markedly reduced dependence on nonlegal sources. His book thus provides
important theoretical support for those, like Anthony Kronman, who seek to
reassert the traditional legal virtues of "prudence" and "practical reason" and
prevent law from becoming a mere province of economics or other external
disciplines. Although he never uses the term "practical reason," Patterson
emphasizes case-by-case balancing of the forms or "modalities" of legal
argument, with no single overriding principle determining the outcome. This
method has strong intimations of a practical reason approach. Similarly, his
emphases on specifically legal materials and arguments suggest that traditional
legal scholarship, with its emphases on precisely these materials, is likely to
prove most productive, while much of the avant garde legal academy, with its
emphasis on nonlegal sources, may essentially be wasting its time.
Both the intellectual and practical aspects of the traditionalists' perspective
thus find echoes in Patterson's book. Moreover, by using the latest in
postmodern and analytic philosophy to justify a reliance on traditional sources,
Patterson threatens to turn contemporary jurisprudence on its head, casting
Kronman and his allies as the true revolutionaries and the various "law and"
theorists as representatives of a grand but declining intellectual past. His book
thus provides important theoretical ballast for what has been a largely ad hoc
response to the invasion of nonlegal disciplines.
This Review focuses on the implications of Law and Truth for statutory
interpretation, which has been of interest to me in the past.8 Here, as
7. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER (1993) Kronman uses the term "practical wisdom"
to describe the pragmatic, problem-solving abilities associated with the traditional 1awycr-statesman" as
contrasted with the social science and other methodologies preferred by today's legal scholars. See id. at
11-14 (setting forth the "lawyer-statesman" ideal); id. at 41-43 (describing the concept of practical wisdom).
id. at 265-69 (contrasting practical wisdom with the methodology of contemporary legal scholars) William
Eskridge, Philip Frickey, and other scholars use the term "practical reason" to describe an interpretive
method that eschews universal theory in favor of a case-by-case, balancing approach. See. e.g.. William
N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretatiwn as Practical Reasoning. 42 STA.% L REV
321, 322 n.3 (1990). Although these terms are used somewhat differently, they share an antifoundational
character and an emphasis on pragmatic reasoning tools, and they proceed from common intellectual roots.
See KRONMAN, supra, at 41-43 (tracing practical wisdom to the Aristotelian concept of deliberation in
personal and political matters); Eskridge & Frickey. supra. at 323-24 (tracing practical reason to the
Aristotelian idea of phronesis and the work of modem pragmatic philosophers)
Not all legal scholars share Kronman's (or Patterson's) enthusiasm for traditional legal methods or
their skepticism of "external" theory. See Richard Posner, Legal Scholarship Todas. 45 STA."i. L REV.
1647, 1657-58 (1993). As Posner writes:
In the reorientation of legal scholarship from the legal profession to the umverstty. something
has been lost, but less than the traditionalists believe .... A certain professionalism, a certain
dependability, a certain craftsmanship has been lost. but intellectual sophistication has been
gained, along with a broadening of legal scholarship that has for the first time enabled it to
touch, and potentially to enrich, neighboring fields.
Id.
8. See, e.g., Michael Livingston, Congress. the Courts. and the Code- Legislative Historv and the
Interpretation of Tax Statutes, 69 TEx. L. REv. 819 (1991) [hereinafter Lvingston. Legislative Htstory];
Michael A. Livingston, Practical Reason, "Purposivism, " and the Interpretation of Tax Statutes. 52 TAX
L. REv. (forthcoming 1998) [hereinafter Livingston. Purposivism].
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elsewhere, Patterson's critique is extreme. According to Law and Truth, the
emphasis on interpretation (statutory and otherwise) in contemporary legal
theory is misplaced, with scholars tending to exaggerate both the number and
significance of instances that require interpretation of legal materials, as
opposed to a simple understanding of them.9 Where interpretation is
necessary, scholars do it badly, advancing universal theories (e.g., originalism,
purposivism, textualism)'0 that fail to capture the process of case-by-case
argument that is the essence of the decisional process. Those scholars whose
work Patterson does like, such as William Eskridge, are themselves
misunderstood, taken to advance liberal new doctrines when they are in fact
preserving the coherence of the traditional forms or "modalities" of legal
argument. Statutory interpretation thus provides a microcosm of Patterson's
broader critique, which emphasizes the unique nature of legal argument and
expresses a high degree of skepticism toward most contemporary legal theory.
Patterson's critique, while radical, is not without precedent. His emphasis
on reasoned, case-by-case argument is consistent with the view of statutory
interpretation as practical reasoning, a view associated most prominently with
Eskridge and Philip Frickey." Patterson's is a very particular kind of
practical reasoning, however, emphasizing the role of doctrine and prudence
rather than engaging in the usual debate between textualism and historicism
and viewing skeptically nonlegal analogies that might influence the
interpretation process. While not necessarily leading to different results,
Patterson's approach provides an alternative understanding of major cases and
suggests a new agenda for statutory interpretation scholars, who would be
urged to spend more time reading cases and other legal materials and (perhaps)
less time seeking theoretical justification for their particular interpretive
approaches. The example of statutory interpretation thus suggests that, while
Law and Truth is in many respects a conservative book, it should not be read
as a mere apologia for resisting change. Although providing a justification for
many traditional methods, Patterson also challenges legal scholars to do their
job better, focusing on the actual language of legal argument and resisting the
temptation to be what they are not.
Lest it appear that I am unqualifiedly supportive of Patterson's analysis,
I must state that I have many serious reservations about Patterson's approach
9. See PATTERSON, supra note 2, at 71-75 (objecting to the "interpretive universalism" of Ronald
Dworkin and Stanley Fish, which suggests that all of law is a matter of interpretation, but conceding that
interpretation is at times a significant legal activity). Patterson uses the term "interpretation" more broadly
than the statutory interpretation theorists do, including, for example, constitutional or other nonstatutory
materials; in practice, however, most of his examples involve statutory interpretation cases.
10. For a discussion of these universal interpretive theories, see infra notes 69-70 and accompanying
text.
11. See Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 7; see also, e.g., Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey,
Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REv. 423, 468 (1988) (advocating a practical reason
approach to legislative history); Livingston, Purposivism, supra note 8 (advocating a modified practical
reason approach to tax statutes).
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and the broader movement to which it lends implicit support. In particular, I
am concerned that a more traditional, "internal" view of law may lead to an
excessive conservatism in legal teaching and scholarship, marginalizing
unconventional approaches and failing to account for non-incremental, radical
legal change, which is frequently driven by external forces. I am also
concerned that the resulting scholarship may be dry, missing much of the
intellectual and emotional energy of the contemporary "law and" movements.
To appreciate these objections, however, it is first necessary to explore
Patterson's argument on its own terms. Accordingly, I devote much of this
Review to that undertaking.
This Review is arranged in four parts. Part I summarizes Patterson's
critique of contemporary jurisprudence and his own theory of law as a social,
argumentative practice. Part II discusses his approach to statutory
interpretation, as suggested by his broader theoretical passages and treatment
of individual cases. Part III evaluates Law and Truth in the context of previous
interpretation scholarship, considering how a Pattersonian judge or scholar
might approach a case differently from her predecessors and noting the
advantages and disadvantages of that approach. Part IV returns to broader
themes, considering Patterson's place in legal scholarship generally and, in
particular, in the effort to assert practical reason as a dominant theme in the
legal academy. The Review concludes by considering the limitations of
Patterson's approach, including the danger of delegitimizing nonlegal modes
of argument and the difficulty that his theory may have in accounting for
revolutionary or non-incremental change in legal ideas and institutions.
Law and Truth is a work of demolition and reconstruction. In his
introductory chapter, Patterson poses the question that will serve as his
underlying theme: What does it mean to say that a proposition of law is
true? 12 Chapters Two through Six present five existing answers to this
question, each of which Patterson methodically sets up and then, just as
methodically, knocks down. Only in his seventh chapter does Patterson leave
any pins standing, and only in Chapter Eight does he present his own,
alternative theory.
Existing theories fail, per Patterson, because they ascribe primary
importance to economic, philosophical, moral, or otherwise nonlegal formulas
in determining the truth of statements of law. Thus, Ernest Weinrib's theory
of legal formalism, which emphasizes the "internal coherence" of legal
doctrine and the role of law in providing corrective justice to individual
12. See PATT'RSON, supra note 2, at 3.
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litigants, 3 fails because it assumes-but (in Patterson's view) cannot
prove-that internal coherence is superior to other values and that a coherent
legal system must necessarily emphasize corrective rather than distributive
justice. 14 Michael Moore's moral realism, which holds that law conforms to
discoverable ("real") moral truths, 5 fails because it exaggerates the
similarities between law and scientific research and cannot explain how the
real world exercises an effective check on our assertions of legal norms.'
6
H.L.A. Hart's legal positivism, which asserts that social facts, rather than the
legal characterization of those facts, are the key to legal meaning, 7 fails
because it cannot account for, among other things, the different interpretations
that lawyers attribute to the behavior of enacting legislators, even when it is
agreed that the legislators followed a single, correct procedure.'
8
Finally-and most important for our survey-the various theories of law
as interpretation fail because they exaggerate the importance of interpretation
as opposed to understanding of legal materials and cannot account for the
actual practice of legal argument. Dworkin's jurisprudence, which emphasizes
the moral principles underlying law and sees judges and other lawmakers as
13. See ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 1-21 (1995) (setting forth the internal
intelligibility or coherence of legal doctrine as an alternative to various "law and" approaches); Ernest 1.
Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97 YALE L.J. 949, 961-66 (1988)
(describing the "immanent intelligibility" of law and its relevance to a revived formalist approach).
14. See PATTERSON, supra note 2, at 22-42; cf. Weinrib, supra note 13, at 1006 ("Loss-spreading....
like all external goals, is a matter for distributive justice and cannot be coherently achieved within the
relationship of doer and sufferer (i.e., corrective justice)."). For example, Patterson argues that Weinrib
dismisses law and economics as incoherent without establishing that the "immanent" coherence of law is
superior to that of law-and-economics theory. See PATrERSON, supra note 2, at 35 n.70; cf. Weinrib, supra
note 13, at 968 n.48 (emphasizing the circularity of Richard Epstein's law-and-economics approach).
Patterson shares Weinrib's resistance to external formulas, but regards the latter's search for coherence as
merely another such formula. See PATTERSON, supra note 2, at 35-39. Patterson prefers an emphasis on law
as a social, argumentative practice; "coherence" for Patterson is a descriptive term for a well-functioning
legal system rather than an overriding rule to which other norms are secondary or subservient. See infra
notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
15. See Michael S. Moore, The Interpretive Turn in Modern Theory: A Turn for the Worse?, 41 STAN.
L. REv. 871, 881-90 (1989) [hereinafter Moore, Interpretive Turn]; Michael S. Moore, A Natural Law
Theory of Interpretation, 58 S. CAL. L. REV. 277, 286 (1985).
16. See PATTERSON, supra note 2, at 43-51; cf. Moore, Interpretive Turn, supra note 15, at 882-83
(arguing that a legal realist must apply "metaphysical" notions of scientific and moral truth in interpreting
a statute). Chapter Three of Law and Truth also includes a discussion of David Brink's "natural kind
semantics," see David 0. Brink, Legal Theory, Legal Interpretation, and Judicial Review, 17 PHIL. & PUB.
AFFs. 105, 116-19 (1988); David 0. Brink, Semantics and Legal Interpretation (Further Thoughts), 2 CAN.
J.L. & JURISPRUDENCE 181, passim (1989), which Patterson rejects for similar reasons, see PATTERSON,
supra note 2, at 51-58.
17. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 269 (2d ed. 1994) ("According to my theory, the
existence and content of the law can be identified by reference to the social sources of law (e.g. legislation,
judicial decisions, social customs) without reference to morality except where the law thus identified has
itself incorporated moral criteria .... ").
18. See PATTERSON, supra note 2, at 59-70. The strengths and limitations of Patterson's critique of
Hart and other authors are dealt with in some detail by other reviews, and will not be repeated here. See.
e.g., Kress, supra note 6 (challenging Patterson's critique of Hart and Dworkin's jurisprudence and
suggesting that Patterson himself can be understood as taking a modified positivist position); Law, Truth,
and Interpretation, supra note 6 (presenting various authors' views of Patterson's work and his place in
contemporary legal and philosophical discourse).
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engaged in an intense, highly personal process of interpretation in order to
uncover these principles,' 9 fails; it overestimates the degree of interpretation
required and assumes (incorrectly) that the making of law is a personal and not
a societal effort.20 Stanley Fish's idea of law as an interpretive community2'
similarly fails because it assumes that lawyers who disagree must be members
of different interpretive communities and discounts the possibility of reasoned
debate and discussion within one existing community 2  Patterson takes a
special pleasure in demolishing Fish, with whom he has an ongoing intellectual
feud.23
Only in Chapter Seven does Patterson find a theory-Philip Bobbitt's idea
of the forms or "modalities" of constitutional argument-that he appears
genuinely to like. According to Bobbitt, constitutional law is defined, not by
the effort to maximize some external value (morality, efficiency, coherence,
etc.) or by any grand theory of interpretation, but by the use of appropriate
modalities in arguing and deciding constitutional issues.2" Bobbitt identifies
six such modalities: historical (emphasizing the intention of the Framers and
ratifiers of the Constitution); textual (emphasizing the plain meaning of the
words of the Constitution); structural (emphasizing the relationship between
different parts of the Constitution); doctrinal or precedential (emphasizing
existing doctrines and case law); ethical (reflecting fundamental rights or
cultural values); and prudential (seeking to balance the costs and benefits of
a particular rule),?5 A lawyer or judge who operates within these modalities
19. See RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE 52 (1986) (defining "constructisc interpretation' as "a
matter of imposing purpose on an objective practice in order to make of it the best possible example of the
form or genre to which it is taken to belong"); RONALD DWORKIN. TAKING RIGITS SERIOLSLY 81-130
(1977) (describing the rule of moral justification in deciding hard cases).
20. See PATTERSON, supra note 2. at 71-98. For a discussion of Patterson's critique of Dorkin and
Dworkin's broader jurisprudence, see Michael C. Dorf, Thalh. Justice, and the American Constitution. 97
COLUM. L. REV. 133 (1997) (book review). For a criticism of Dworkin's earlier work and of "coherence-
theories as applied generally to legal materials, see Kenneth I Kress. Legal Reasoning and Coherence
Theories: Dwvorkin's Rights Thesis, Retroactivi.; and the Linear Order of Decisions. 72 CAL L. REv 369.
400-02 (1984) (noting that coherence theories may make legal rights dependent upon the temporal order
in which cases are decided).
21. See STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS9 THE ALTHORITY OF INTERPREfnVE
COMMUNITIES 338 (1980) [hereinafter FISH. Is THERE A TEXT) ("[Tlhe fact of agreement. rather than being
a proof of the stability of objects, is a testimony to the power of an interpretive community "). see also
STANLEY FISH, DOING WHAT COMES NATURALLY: CHANGE. RHETORIC. AND TIE PRACTICE OF THEORY
IN LITERARY AND LEGAL STUDIES 294-311 (1989) (applying his theory to the issue of legal interpretation)
22. See PATTERSON, supra note 2, at 99-127.
23. See, e.g., Dennis Patterson, The Poverty of Interpretive Universalism: Toward the Reconstruction
of Legal Theory, 72 TEX. L. REV. 1 (1993); Stanley Fish, How Come You Do Me like You Do' A Response
to Dennis Patterson, 72 TEX. L. REV. 57 (1993): Dennis Patterson, You Made Me Do It MY Reph to
Stanley Fish, 72 TEX. L. REV. 67 (1993).
24. See PHILIP BOBBITr, CONSTITrIONAL INT-ERPRETATION 8-9. 11-30 (1991).
25. See id. at 12-13, quoted in PATTERSON. supra note 2. at 137. Bobbin's book is concerned
specifically with constitutional cases, although its principles appear equally applicable to statutory
interpretation and other legal issues. In Chapter Eight of Law and Truth, Patterson refers to four generally
applicable forms of legal argument (textual, doctrinal, historical, and prudential), omitting the structural and
ethical components. See PATTERSON. supra note 2, at 151-79. In a conversation. Patterson suggested that
this omission was intentional, the structural and ethical modalities being specific to constitutional argument
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is engaged in the process of seeking and identifying legal truth. One who steps
outside the modalities-for example, a lawyer who argues that abortion should
be constitutionally protected because it will help the President carry California
in the next election, or because most of his friends think it should be-is no
longer engaged in this process. But there is, according to Bobbitt, no
metaprocedure for resolving conflicts between the modalities; such resolution
is, in the end, a matter of individual conscience, about which theorists
(including Bobbitt himself) can offer no particular guidance.26
In Patterson's view, Bobbitt is asking the right question: What forms of
legal reasoning or argument make a proposition of law true, without recourse
to external values?27 Yet Patterson finds Bobbitt's recourse to conscience to
resolve conflict between the modalities troubling.28 In Chapter Eight,
Patterson presents his own answer to this problem. In his view, conflicts
between (or within) the modalities are resolved not at the level of individual
conscience, but by shared linguistic practices, such as the judicial practice of
opinion-giving or the writing of scholarly books and articles that suggest the
rightness of a particular outcome or approach.29 When engaging in such
activities, lawyers (or legal scholars) attempt to convince their audiences that
their preferred approaches cohere with already agreed-to positions better than
any available alternative; or, as Patterson more pithily states, "In choosing
between different interpretations, we favor those that clash least with
everything else we take to be true. '30 For example, in writing an opinion, a
judge seeks to demonstrate that her decision is consistent with existing
precedent, while a scholar advancing a new interpretive principle argues that
this principle advances commonly accepted legal values better than alternative
methods.3' While individual modalities may be influenced by external
values-much as, say, music is influenced by art, or philosophy by
science-legal truth is determined, not by reference to such values, but by
persuasiveness in the making of legal arguments. Contemporary jurisprudence
typically misses this point and accordingly obscures rather than illuminates the
Bobbitt's (and Patterson's) modalities incorporate some features of universal theories of interpretation
but avoid giving primary status to any individual modality. In this sense, they reflect an aspect of the
pragmatic or practical reason approach. For further discussion of Patterson's relationship to the practical
reason school, see infra Part III.
26. See BOBBI'T, supra note 24, at 184 ("The recursion to conscience is the crucial activity on which
the constitutional system of interpretation that I have described depends."), quoted in PATTERSON, supra
note 2, at 143.
27. See PATTERSON, supra note 2, at 137.
28. See id. at 142-46.
29. See id. at 169-79.
30. Id. at 172.
31. See infra notes 40-58 and accompanying text (describing Patterson's view of various statutory
interpretation cases); infra notes 59-68 and accompanying text (describing Patterson's view of legal
scholarship in the area of statutory interpretation).
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nature of law.3
2
Two potential objections to Patterson's line of argument bear mentioning.
First, some have argued that Patterson devotes a fair amount of space to
critiquing other people's ideas but provides only a sketchy model of his own
jurisprudence. In particular, he fails to demonstrate that the forms or modalities
of legal argument are any less dependent on external values than (say)
Dworkin's moral principles or the efficiency criteria of the law-and-economics
movement. Consequently, his own theory is subject to the same critique he
directs at opponents.33 This objection strikes me as largely unconvincing, or
in any event not terribly damaging to Patterson's thesis. Patterson argues that
law is a self-contained practice having equal standing with science or
philosophy, not that it should be isolated from such activities. The suggestion
that his modalities reflect external content thus does not undermine his point
that legal modalities cannot be understood in terms of external disciplines. '
A second objection is that, by emphasizing the modalities of legal
argument, Patterson (like Bobbitt before him)35 places a great deal of pressure
on the definition of the modalities, on what constitutes an approved form of
legal discourse as opposed to an unapproved and presumably illegitimate
mode. Although Patterson himself does not do so, there is a danger that others
may use his theory to delegitimize interdisciplinary or other nontraditional
modes of argument, particularly those with displeasing implications for the
existing legal order. A theory that emphasizes internal coherence and
32. See PATrERSON, supra note 2, at 169-82. Patterson's approach thus attempts to elevate law from
a second- to a first-order activity, with its own distinct language and method. Accordingly, one is to
understand law on its own terms rather than as an extension of some other discipline. See id. at 170 n.69
(citing LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS § 199. at 81 (G.E.M. Anscombe trans..
Macmillan 3d ed. 1958) for the proposition that knowledge is an ability manifested in linguistic practices).
Patterson's view of law evokes Quine's description of science as a "web of belief" in which the truth of
individual statements depends upon their relationship to previous statements already agreed to be true. See
id. at 151-69, 172; see also id. at 158 (citing WILLARD VAN ORMAN QUINE. Two Dogmas of Emptrictsm.
in FROM A LOGICAL POINT OF VIEW 20, 20-46 (1953) (rejecting the idea of a "basic" unit of knowledge
and seeing knowledge as embedded in "the whole of science")).
Patterson's view has echoes-albeit fainter ones-of postmodem philosophy. which abandons the
correspondence theory of truth (true statements are true because they correspond to a mind-independent
state of affairs) in favor of an emphasis on language (true statements are true because they are established
as such in accordance with the rules of a particular linguistic practice). See id. at 170 ("For the
postmodemist, knowledge is an ability, manifested in linguistic practices."). Whether Patterson needs this
intellectual firepower to make his point is debatable, but it helps to establish his unique credentials, He is
surely one of the few legal scholars to utilize nonlegal sources in order to show that we really don't need
them. See infra text accompanying note 97.
33. See, e.g., Bakhurst, supra note 6, at 400 (arguing that Patterson's "coherentist" position is in many
ways similar to that of Veinrib, which Patterson criticized): Kress. supra note 6. at 1922-26 (arguing that
Patterson's theory is no less "truth-conditional" than traditional positivist accounts).
34. I have perhaps contributed to the confusion by using the terms "internal" and "external" to descnbe
Patterson's differences with his opponents. These terms. I believe, are useful in explonng the implications
of Patterson's work, but they appear nowhere within it. Cf. PATTERSON. supra note 2. at 182 ("The law
is not isolated from the social and discursive spaces around it. However, law is an identifiable practice, one
with its own argumentative grammar. The mistake of so much of contemporary junsprudence is to think
that this grammar is reducible to the forms of argument of another discipline.").
35. See BOBBrIT, supra note 24, at 11-22 (setting forth the modalities of constitutional argument).
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incremental decisionmaking may likewise have difficulty accounting for radical
changes in law and legal institutions. This strikes me as a more significant
criticism of Patterson's argument, and I shall have occasion to return to it in
the pages that follow.
36
II
Law and Truth is a work of jurisprudence, rather than an essay on
interpretation per se, and it contains no generalized discussion of statutory
interpretation theory or practice. Yet, a significant portion of the book is
devoted to statutory interpretation cases, and Patterson frequently uses such
cases to demonstrate the operation of his theory and the limitations of other
approaches. This is especially true of Patterson's concluding chapter, in which
he presents his own comprehensive vision of law and legal theory.37 Statutory
interpretation may thus be a convenient window through which to observe
Patterson's theory in action and to test it against the vagaries of real world
experience.
Patterson's views on statutory interpretation may be determined
deductively, from his broader jurisprudence, and inductively, from his
treatment of individual cases. A review of the latter category suggests that
Patterson is critical of decisions that enunciate any one overriding rule or
principle of statutory interpretation, particularly when such a principle depends
on extralegal theories or norms. Instead, he prefers a balanced approach that
seeks to harmonize new with old interpretations and that does the least possible
damage to the existing practice and belief within a given area of law. This
approach is consistent with Patterson's broader jurisprudence, which
emphasizes fidelity to the forms of legal argument and decisions that "clash
least with everything else we take to be true. ' 38 Among contemporary
interpretation theories,39 Patterson's appears closest to a pragmatic or practical
36. See infra notes 101-105 and accompanying text.
37. See PATTERSON, supra note 2, at 151-79.
38. Id. at 172.
39. The principal contemporary theories of statutory interpretation include the textualist approach
associated with Justice Antonin Scalia and Judge Frank Easterbrook, which emphasizes the role of statutory
text and is skeptical of legislative history and similar sources, see ANTONIN SCALIA ET AL., A MATTER OF
INTERPRErATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 23-25 (Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); Frank H. Easterbrook,
Statutes' Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REv. 533 (1983); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Texualism, 37
UCLA L. REv. 621 (1990) (discussing textualism and Scalia's role in its resurgence); the "modified
intentionalism" associated with Judge Richard Posner and others, which emphasizes the intent of the
enacting legislature, see Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading of Statutes and the
Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REv. 263 (1982); the purposivist approach originally identified with Henry Hart
and Albert Sacks, which emphasizes the search for broad, underlying statutory purposes, see HENRY M.
HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1111-380 (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P.
Frickey eds., 1994); and the practical reason method most prominently associated with Eskridge and
Frickey, which emphasizes a case-by-case approach utilizing textual, historical, and dynamic or "evolutivo"
(i.e., post-enactment) perspectives depending upon the facts of the individual case, see, e.g., Eskridge &
Frickey, supra note 7, at 322. To avoid confusion between Patterson's argument and my own interpretation
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reason approach, but it exhibits a marked emphasis on doctrinal and prudential
considerations, as well as a strong sense of the limited scope of the
interpretation (versus simple understanding) of statutes.
Patterson discusses statutory interpretation primarily in the context of two
cases: Riggs v. Palmer,40 a nineteenth-century inheritance case, and United
Steelworkers v. Weber,41 a highly politicized, 1970s-era Supreme Court
decision. Riggs, decided in 1889, involved a grandson named as a beneficiary
in the will of his grandfather, who apparently did not envision that the
grandson would poison him and thereby activate the will.4 " The issue was
whether the grandson could inherit despite these facts. The court held that he
could not, citing the principle that no person should profit from his own
wrongdoing, together with historical precedents for interpreting a statute in a
nonliteral fashion when necessary to achieve the underlying goal of the
statute.43 The dissent countered with the equally timeworn principle that no
person should be punished twice for the same offense." The majority found
its statutory purpose argument to outweigh this latter consideration, noting
further that the grandson might never have inherited without the murder and
that he had thus not technically been deprived of anything by the court's
decision.45
Weber, decided ninety years later, involved a white worker who sued his
employer for so-called reverse discrimination under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964.6 At issue was a voluntary affirmative action plan,
adopted by a private employer, that provided access to job training programs
for black workers with less seniority than white ones.47 The language of the
statute appeared to favor the plaintiff, forbidding employers "to discriminate
against any individual ... because of such individual's race," without any
special dispensation for affirmative action programs.4s But the Court held for
the employer, finding that Congress's principal purpose in enacting Title VII
was to improve job opportunities for African Americans and that a flat
prohibition of voluntary affirmative action programs was inconsistent with this
of that argument, I postpone a fuller discussion of statutory interpretation theory until Part Ill
40. 22 N.E. 188 (N.Y. 1889). Riggs is discussed primarily in Patterson's chapter on Fish's idea of law
as an interpretive community, with a reprise in the concluding chapter of the book. See PATrERSO.N. supra
note 2, at 114-17, 123-25, 172-74.
41. 443 U.S. 193 (1979). Weber is discussed primarily in Patterson's chapter on legal positivism. See
PATERSON, supra note 2, at 64-68.
42. Although I suspect neither the court nor Patterson was aware of this. Riggs is thus a close
approximation to the famous definition of the Yiddish word chutzpah. an individual who murders his
parents and then throws himself on the mercy of the court because he is an orphan. See LEO ROSTM'. TtE
JOYS OF YIDDISH 92 (1968).
43. See Riggs, 22 N.E. at 189-90.
44. See id. at 193 (Gray, J.. dissenting).
45. See id. at 189-90 (majority opinion).
46. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)(1) to (17) (1994).
47. See United Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193. 197-99 (1979).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000(e)-2(d), cited in Weber, 443 U.S. at 200
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goal. 49 Thus, a nonliteral interpretation was justified in order to achieve this
purpose. A dissent, authored by then-Justice Rehnquist, argued that the
historical record was mixed and that the language of the statute supported
Weber's position.5" A concurring opinion by Justice Blackmun questioned the
majority's analysis, but held for the employer on essentially two grounds, one
doctrinal (a contrary holding would negate precedents sanctioning voluntary
affirmative action plans) and the other prudential (a contrary holding would
make it difficult for employers to avoid liability for past discrimination against
blacks without encouraging litigation by displaced whites).5'
Riggs and Weber are very different cases, but Patterson's responses to
them are strikingly similar. In each case, Patterson prefers the opinion that he
believes causes the least damage to existing doctrine and precedent-what
might be called the Quinean web or "force field" of existing decisional law.
52
He shows a particular fondness for prudential or practical considerations,
especially when they are buttressed by doctrinal concerns. Thus, in Riggs,
Patterson prefers the majority's approach, which demonstrates a broad
awareness of historical precedents regarding the nonliteral interpretation of
statutes, to that of the dissent, which appears to him literal and cramped.53 He
further emphasizes the practical consequences of the decision, noting that the
majority's opinion could not take property away from the grandson because the
issue was whether he was rightfully entitled to the property in the first
place.54 Similarly, with respect to Weber, Patterson lauds Blackmun's
concurrence for its emphasis on prudential considerations and its faithfulness
to existing Title VII decisions, which enable Blackmun to avoid (in Patterson's
view) a sterile debate regarding the legislative intention behind the Civil Rights
Act. As Patterson explains it, "By fitting his prudential arguments within the
fold of precedent, Blackmun breaks free of the intractable differences between
the majority and the dissent, thereby enabling him to write an opinion that is
far more persuasive than its competitors. 55
While emphasizing doctrinal and prudential concerns, Patterson remains
skeptical of universal interpretive principles, particularly of a simplistic
49. See Weber, 443 U.S. at 200-09.
50. See id. at 219-55 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
51. See id. at 209-16 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
52. See supra note 32.
53. Patterson argues:
Through careful and wide-ranging comparison with other areas of law, the majority shows the
problem at issue to be long-standing and, more importantly, that its solution is consistent with
other solutions to problems of textual meaning. In short, the success of the majority's argument
is to be explained in terms of its showing the degree to which it can be made to cohere with
everything else we take to be true about legal texts ....
PATTERSON, supra note 2, at 174.
54. See id.
55. Id. at 67. Patterson especially lauds Blackmun for "weaving" doctrine and prudence together in
his opinion: "The measure of good and bad effects employed by Blackmun comes not from a utilitarian
calculus, but from precedent." Id.
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purposivism that requires a single, overriding purpose to be ascribed to a
particular statute. In this vein, he criticizes Fish's reading of Riggs, which
assumes that the majority and dissent ascribed differing underlying purposes
to probate law-ensuring that the law would never operate to benefit a
wrongdoer versus ensuring orderly dissolution of property-and that the
differences between the opinions are explicable on this basis. 6  In fact,
Patterson argues, the statute had, not one, but two or more competing
purposes, as both the majority and dissenting opinions recognized; the issue
was which purpose was more significant under the particular facts, and the
majority's interpretation was simply more persuasive on this point."7
Similarly, regarding Weber, Patterson (together with Eskridge) finds the search
for a single predominant purpose of Title VII unproductive and praises
Blackmun's concurrence for avoiding this line of analysis.5'
Patterson further develops this approach-coupling a pragmatic and
balanced view of statutory interpretation with a dislike for universal theories-in
his closing chapter, in which he presents his theory of law as an argumentative
practice. 59 Here, after completing his discussion of Riggs, he turns to the
broader issue of statutory interpretation theory and thus (implicitly) away from
56. See FISH, Is THERE A TEXT, supra note 21. at 278-81.
57. See PATTERSON, supra note 2, at 115-16 (describing Fish's vieew of Riggs as "wildly inaccurate"
and noting that both the majority and the dissent recognized the existence of more than one lcgislatice
purpose). Patterson's view of Riggs also differs, albeit more incrementally, from that of Dworkin. who uses
the case to demonstrate the existence of legal principles that compete with specific laws (e.g.. that no man
should profit from his own wrongdoing) and thereby to discredit the positivists' emphasis on hard and fast
legal rules. See DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY, supra note 19. at 22-45. Patterson no doubt shares
Dworkin's rejection of positivism, but he would likely be skeptical of Dworkms reliance on moral
principles to determine the correct legal outcome.
58. See PATTERSON, supra note 2, at 64-68; see also \Ailliam N. Eskndge. Jr, Di-namic Statutory
Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479, 1488-94 (1987) (rejecting the Weber Court's search for a
predominant legislative purpose of Title VII).
Besides Riggs and Weber, Patterson discusses three cases in the text of his book The first. Lamb Y.
London Borough of Camden, 2 All E.R. 408 (C.A. 198 1). is used as an example of Ernest Weinnb's theory
of legal formalism and coherence, which Patterson eventually finds unconvincing. See PATTERSO.. supra
note 2, at 31-35; see also Weinrib, supra note 13. at 1006-07. The second. Church of the Holy Trinity, v.
United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892), is a statutory interpretation classic that Patterson cites for the
proposition that a statute may require interpretation when one set of facts is at issue, but may appear quite
clear on an initial reading when applied to a different set. See PArTERSON. supra note 2. at 95-96 A third
decision, Touche Ross & Co. v. Redington, 442 U.S. 560 (1979). is borrowed from Judge Posncr's work
on statutory interpretation to demonstrate the limitations of interpretive canons, the facts of the case are
not discussed. See PATTERSON, supra note 2. at 175-76: see also Richard A Posner. Statutors
Interpretation-in the Classroom and in the Courtroom. 50 U. Cit L. RE'v 800. 813 t1983)
59. I focus in this discussion on those relatively few pages in which Patterson specifically addresses
statutory interpretation cases and issues. In a broader sense, the entire chapter could arguably be read as
a theory of statutory interpretation, since Bobbitt's six modalities-historncal, textual, structural, doctinnal.
ethical, and prudential-appear no less applicable to statutory than constitutional interpretation and
Patterson's own discussion primarily emphasizes statutory cases I think. ho%seser. that such a
characterization would be a bit too clever, for two reasons First. Bobbitt is asowedly discussing
constitutional cases; it may well be that he would utilize the same modalities in statutor) decisions, but it
seems fairest to let him decide this. Second. I am uncomfortable rading Patterson. wsho generally
downplays the significance of interpretation, as primarily an interpretation theorist. It seems more honest
to see statutory interpretation as one small but important aspect of Patterson's argument and to deduce his
views on the subject from those passages in which he specifically deals with it
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the role of judges to that of legal teachers and scholars.6° Specifically,
Patterson considers two scholarly arguments. The first is Judge Richard Posner's
critique of interpretive canons regarding legislative history, which Patterson
cites as an effective example of argument about the content of an individual
modality (in this case, historical argument).6' The second is Eskridge's appeal
for "dynamic" statutory interpretation, which takes into account political and
social changes occurring after the enactment of a statute, and which constitutes
a more radical argument over the nature of an argumentative mode.
62
Patterson's primary concern is not with the substance of Posner's or
Eskridge's arguments but with the way in which these scholars make them. In
Patterson's view, what they and other legal scholars do is merely another
version of what judges do in deciding an individual case; that is, they convince
us of something new by demonstrating its consistency with older, already
agreed-to concepts and beliefs. Thus, Posner uses the accepted rationale for
historical argument-that it is based on a realistic understanding of the
lawmaking process-to demonstrate that many existing interpretive canons are
based on unduly optimistic assumptions about that process and should,
accordingly, be changed.63 Similarly, Eskridge shows that a traditional
approach to legislative history fails to deal adequately with changing or
unforeseen circumstances and argues for a dynamic interpretation that takes
these later changes into account.64 Eskridge's critique is broader than
Posner's-he deals with the very nature of historical argument rather than with
specific applications-but his mode of argument is the same, reasoning from
generally accepted norms and values to new, more controversial proposals.
Both Posner and Eskridge, that is, make quintessentially legal arguments, and
they succeed precisely because they are able to make their arguments fit the
"web" of established belief and practice in the relevant field.65
60. In Patterson's schema, the first discussion of Riggs concerns the criteria for choosing among forms
of argument in cases of conflict, while the second concerns the content of the forms of argument
themselves. See PAT'ERSON, supra note 2, at 172, 174.
61. See id. at 174-76. Posner's argument is set forth in RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS:
CRISIS AND REFORM 286-93 (1985); and Posner, supra note 58, at 811-14,
62. See Eskridge, supra note 58.
63. See PATrERSON, supra note 2, at 174-76 (discussing Posner, supra note 58, at 811). For example,
the canon of expressio unius est exclusio alterius ("the expression of one thing is the exclusion of another,"
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 581 (6th ed. 1990)) makes sense if all legislative omissions are deliberate,
which they are not. See PATTERSON, supra note 2, at 175.
64. See PATTERSON, supra note 2, at 176-79 (discussing Eskridge, supra note 58, at 1483). For
example, the Weber Congress failed to anticipate that the effects of discrimination would persist oven if
individuals were no longer consciously prejudiced, so resort to post-enactment changes was appropriate in
this case. See id. at 177.
65. See, e.g., id. at 178 (describing Eskridge's argument as "something new and different.. . but in
a distinct way," namely, a way that uses traditional criteria to demonstrate the limitations of existing
historical argument and the need to expand it in appropriate cases). Patterson's reading of Eskridge differs
in some respects from Eskridge's own, which emphasizes the differences between dynamic interpretation
and historical argument as previously understood. See Eskridge, supra note 58, at 1479 ("Traditional
doctrine teaches that statutes should not be interpreted dynamically.").
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Patterson's concern here is with the nature of legal argument rather than
statutory interpretation specifically, but his discussion is of interest to us for
two reasons. First, while he avoids endorsing any one theory, Patterson is
plainly sympathetic to Eskridge's dynamic model, which he sees as a
reasonable, even necessary, extension of historical argument. Together with his
earlier comments on Riggs and Weber, this chapter would appear to place
Patterson closer to Eskridge, Frickey, and other advocates of pragmatic or
"practical reason" interpretation-including a dynamic perspective where
appropriate-than to advocates of textualist or other theories. 6
Second, Patterson's reading of Posner and Eskridge has significant
implications for interpretation scholars. If truth in law is a matter of successful
application of the forms of legal argument, and if this is just as true of legal
scholarship as it is of judicial opinions, there may be relatively little need for
recourse to nonlegal sources in the interpretation debate. Much of
contemporary interpretation scholarship, with its extensive reliance on Biblical
hermeneutics, literary theory, and other external referents, may thus be
entertaining but irrelevant, the real issue being the consistency of any
interpretive method with other, uncontested portions of the existing legal
universe. This is in some respects a more profound point than Patterson's
opinion of particular specific interpretive methods, and we shall have occasion
to revisit it in our later discussion.68
III
As best as can be determined, then, Patterson's view of statutory
interpretation is something like the following: Interpretation (including
statutory interpretation) is less important in law that it is usually thought to be;
it is subsidiary to understanding and capable of taking place only against the
background of a nonreflective linguistic practice. When it does take place,
interpretation should be conducted like any other argumentative practice,
seeking outcomes that cause the least damage to results and interpretations
previously agreed to be true. Various modalities or forms of argument (e.g.,
textualism) are appropriate in statutory as well as constitutional interpretation,
66. The issue of practical reason is discussed further infra Part Ill.
67. A LEXIS search for law review articles containing the terms "'statutory interpretation and (Bible
or literature)" was interrupted because it was likely to produce more than 1000 entries. Search of LEXIS.
LAWREV Library, ALLREV File (Oct. 30. 1997). For a (very) brief sample of this scholarship, see
generally INTERPRETING LAW AND LrIERATURE: A HERMENETIC READER (Sanford Levinson & Steven
Mailloux eds., 1988), which collects articles on legal and literary interpretation: \William N. Eskridge, Jr..
GadamerStatutory Interpretation, 90 COLUst. L. REV. 609 (1990). which discusses hermencutic theory:
and Interpretation Symposium, 58 S. CAL. L. REv. at i (1985). which collects articles on interpretive
methodologies from various nonlegal disciplines, including literature, religion, and the physical sciences.
For an unusual approach to constitutional law. emphasizing parallels between legal and religious
interpretation, see SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITtrlONAL FAmI (1988).
68. See infra Part IV.
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but no one of these must be elevated above the others, and the argument over
the primacy or content of these argumentative forms should be conducted in
the same manner as the application of the forms themselves-that is, by
choosing the method or process that is least inconsistent with accepted methods
or processes. Dynamic or evolutive considerations are an appropriate and,
indeed, vital part of historical argument. One should be suspicious of all-
purpose interpretive principles, purposivist or otherwise, just as one should be
suspicious of theories that elevate interpretation generally to the center of legal
discourse.
What are the consequences of this view, and how does it differ from the
views of previous authors? How might a Pattersonian judge decide a statutory
interpretation case, and what sort of interpretation scholarship would a
Pattersonian scholar produce?
To answer these questions, a brief detour may be appropriate. For the
mountains of ink spilled on the subject in recent decades, there remain perhaps
four basic approaches to statutory interpretation.69 The first of these,
textualism, regards the statutory text as the primary and in some cases
exclusive source of statutory meaning; when the immediate text does not
answer the relevant question, this approach recommends that one look
elsewhere in the relevant statute rather than consult legislative history or other
sources. The second, intentionalism, emphasizes the intent of the enacting
legislature and tolerates consultation of committee reports and other legislative
history, at least when the statutory language is ambiguous or unclear. The
third, purposivism, is similar to the second, but emphasizes a search for the
underlying goals or policy of a statute rather than the intent behind each
specific provision. Textualism is most famously associated with Justice Scalia;
intentionalism with Judge Posner; and purposivism with the legal process
approach of H.L.A. Hart and Albert Sacks. As a general rule, textualism has
undergone a resurgence in recent years, and purposivism something of a
decline, with intentionalism probably remaining the faith of most judges but
increasingly coming under attack for its intellectual limitations and the
difficulty of its application in actual cases.
70
The practical reason method, associated with Eskridge, Frickey, and others,
may be seen either as a fourth method or as a combination of the other three.
Abjuring any single foundation, practical reason emphasizes a pragmatic, case-
by-case approach, utilizing the textual, historical, and dynamic or evolutive
(i.e., post-enactment) perspectives in varying proportions depending upon the
69. This typology is taken largely from Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 7, at 321-45. For
representative samples of each of the four genres described in this paragraph, see sources cited supra note
39.
70. See generally William S. Blatt, The History of Statutory Interpretation: A Study in Form and
Substance, 6 CARDOZO L. REV. 799 (1985) (tracing the history of statutory interpretation from Blackstonian
notions of equity to the contemporary period).
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age and specificity of the statute in question and changes in public values or
policy context since the statute was enacted.7 In appropriate cases, the court
would also consider the various consequences of alternative possible
interpretations and its own policy sense. Practical reason traces its intellectual
roots to Aristotle72 but is also a reasonable description of how most courts
actually approach cases. It is by now probably the chief intellectual competitor
of a purely textual approach.
Patterson's approach is clearly closer to practical reason than to textualism
or other foundational methods. His approach, however, focuses on doctrinal
and prudential considerations rather than addressing the conflict between "plain
meaning" and legislative history-a conflict which forms the focus of much
practical reason scholarship on statutory interpretation-and tries to limit the
scope of interpretation in a manner reminiscent of the more thoughtful
textualist writers. A Pattersonian scholar would likewise have a distinctive
agenda, emphasizing the fit of interpretive doctrine with other aspects of the
legal system and deliberately deemphasizing nonlegal analogies. Pattersonian
judicial and academic practice would thus fit uneasily into the existing
categories; it lies closest to practical reason but has its own substantive
emphasis and a unique argumentative style.
To observe these differences more closely, consider a case much like
Weber: Bob Jones University v. United States.13 In Bob Jones University, the
IRS sought to revoke a federal income tax exemption for a university and a
private secondary school that were found to discriminate among students on
the basis of race. The language of the statute appeared to favor the schools,
providing a tax exemption for organizations "organized and operated
exclusively for religious, charitable, scientific .... or educational purposes"
and making no mention of racial or other public policy issues.7" But the
Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief Justice Burger, upheld the revocation,
finding that the statute contained an implicit purpose that tax-exempt
organizations advance (or, at the very least, not inhibit) public policy and that
the schools' discriminatory behavior was accordingly inconsistent with
71. These sources would typically be considered in declining order. i.e.. the textual perspective (if it
resolves the case) would be most persuasive, followed by legislative history and. at the base of the triangle.
the dynamic or evolutive perspective. The last of these would include not only applicable current
values-i.e., enlightened public opinion-but also judicial and administratise precedents decided since
enactment, the rough equivalent of Bobbitt's (or Patterson's) doctrinal mode. See Eskridge & Fnckey. supra
note 7, at 353 (providing a schematic representation of the practical reason method) The dynamic
perspective becomes more important for older, less specific statutes, especially when there hase been
significant changes in political or cultural values since the date of enactment. Patterson. by contrast, does
not assign a hierarchy to his modalities and appears in many cases to place doctrinal or prudential concerns
on a par with textual andlor historical materials. For a further discussion of how Patterson's approach
differs from a standard practical reason one, see infra text accompanying notes 87-93
72. See KRONMAN, supra note 7. at 41-43 (descnbing the intellectual roots of the practical reason
method).
73. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
74. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994).
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qualifying for the tax exemption.75 The Court supported this interpretation
with some rather forced historical arguments, emphasizing the statute's origins
in the law of charitable trusts and referring to more recent (i.e., post-
enactment) developments concerning racial discrimination, including judicial,
administrative, and legislative precedents.76 A concurring opinion by Justice
Powell reached the same conclusion but expressed doubts regarding the public
policy requirement, which (it argued) might lead to excessive conformity by
tax-exempt organizations.77 A dissent by Justice Rehnquist sharply criticized
the majority opinion, arguing that the plain meaning of the statute permitted
the exemption and that Congress had taken no action to change this result.7"
Bob Jones University has just about everything in it-legislative purpose,
plain meaning, the role of statutory reenactment in ratifying administrative and
judicial decisions-and scholars have used it to argue for various theories of
statutory interpretation. Thus, taking into account post-enactment changes in
public policy and enlightened public opinion, Eskridge cites the case as a
model for dynamic statutory interpretation,79 while Lawrence Zelenak, a tax
scholar, uses the case as an example of a "nonliteral," purposivist interpretation
of the Internal Revenue Code. 0 Rehnquist's dissent, by contrast, emphasizes
the danger of a dynamic approach: A court may substitute its own policy
analysis for that of the enacting legislature, even in the face of relatively clear
statutory language, with no clear guideposts to restrict its discretion.8' Other
authors have advanced different perspectives, emphasizing (inter alia) the
special nature of the state's encounter with insular religious communities
82
and the implications of the case for the scope of IRS administrative power.
83
How would a Pattersonian judge approach such a case? We can never be
sure, but it is likely that she would try, like Justice Blackmun in Weber, to
escape the textualist-intentionalist dichotomy by appealing to doctrinal and
prudential considerations and that she would seek a holding that would
minimize the damage to existing law and practice in both tax and
75. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 585-602.
76. See id. at 585-92 (discussing charitable trusts and the origins of tax exemptions); id. at 599-602
(recounting post-enactment developments).
77. See id. at 606 (Powell, J., concurring).
78. See id. at 612 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
79. See Eskridge, supra note 58, at 1546-48 (citing Bob Jones University as a case in which the Court
applied a Hart and Sacks "modified intentionalist" approach, but which would have been better decided
using a dynamic method).
80. See Lawrence Zelenak, Thinking About Nonliteral Interpretations of the Internal Revenue Code,
64 N.C. L. REv. 623, 626 (1986) (describing Bob Jones University as a case in which the Court was
relatively candid about adopting a nonliteral interpretation).
81. See Bob Jones Univ., 461 U.S. at 622 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
82. See, e.g., Perry Dane, The Public, the Private, and the Sacred: Variations on a Theme of Nomos
and Narrative, 8 CARDOZO STUD. L. & LITERATURE 15 (1996) (suggesting that the Court took an
unnecessarily narrow view of the issues at stake in Bob Jones University).
83. See, e.g., Charles 0. Galvin & Neal Devins, A Tax Policy Analysis of Bob Jones University v.
United States, 36 VAND. L. REv. 1353 (1983) (suggesting that Bob Jones University unduly expanded the
rulemaking authority of the IRS at the expense of Congress and the judicial branch).
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discrimination law. From a doctrinal perspective, a Pattersonian judge might
consider the weight of judicial authority against racial discrimination by
academic institutions, as well as the likely damage to tax and nontax Supreme
Court precedents if the taxpayers prevailed in the case. On a prudential level,
she would consider the practical effects of such a decision, including the
possible drain of students from public secondary schools if segregated
academies received an effective tax subsidy from the federal government. In
addition, she would note the resultingly high probability of congressional
action to reverse such a holding. Finally, a Pattersonian judge would be
sensitive to the "local" features of the tax code and whether it had historically
been interpreted in a manner different from other statutes.8 In each of these
matters, the actual practice of law, as opposed to its theory, would be of
paramount interest. Thus, Rehnquist's argument that antidiscrimination policy
is better left to Congress would carry relatively little weight if Congress had
historically delegated such power to the courts and the expectation of all
parties was that such delegation would continue. Similarly, an argument
favoring literal interpretation of the tax code would be unpersuasive if tax
lawyers did not, in fact, use the code in this way."' A Pattersonian judge
might thus reach the same holding as the Supreme Court, but would do so for
different reasons.86
Of course, many of these elements-a concern for real world implications,
attention to relevant post-enactment developments, and so forth-are reflected
in the practical reason method of Eskridge, Frickey, and others. But Patterson
differs from the typical practical reason analysis in several important respects.
First, Patterson places a greater emphasis than most scholars on doctrinal
considerations (the so-called "web" of legal belief and practice in a given area
of law),87 which are near the bottom of the Eskridge/Frickey pyramid.'
Where Eskridge sees Bob Jones University as primarily a conflict between the
historical and evolutive perspectives 89-what did Congress mean when it
drafted the relevant statute and how would it approach the same issue
84. On the "local" (i.e., distinctive) features of the tax code. see Lvingston. Legislative History. supra
note 8, at 826-31 (noting that tax law is distinguished by a high level of detail, frequent revision, and a
contextual interpretive tradition). But see BORIS I. BnTKER, FEDERAL TAXATION OF INCOME. ESTATES AND
GiFTs 1 4.2.1 (1981) ("Viewed in the perspective of history ... the Internal Revenue Code is just another
statute, which suffers from the same ailments that have afflicted legislative enactments since Parliament
first tampered with the common law.").
85. See, e.g., Zelenak, supra note 80 (arguing that the tax code is often interpreted in a nonliteral
fashion).
86. Or, she might reach a different holding. Patterson ascnbes a relatively narrow range to statutory
interpretation and might conclude, like Rehnquist, that the plain language of I R.C § 501(c)(3) (1994)
precluded any interpretation at all.
87. See PArrERSON, supra note 2, at 64-68 (discussing Weber); id. at 114-17 (discussing Riggs); id
at 169-79 (providing a model of law as an argumentative practice and applying that model to individual
cases).
88. See supra note 71.
89. See Eskridge, supra note 58, at 1546-49 (discussing Bob Jones Uvn)
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today?-a Pattersonian judge would be more interested in the weight of
judicial authority and the effect of alternate holdings on previously settled
areas of law. Thus, she would embrace a "dynamic" reading of a statute only
if that reading was necessary to protect expectations developed in other
legislation or in judicial and administrative decisions.
Second, and relatedly, a Pattersonian judge would place relatively little
faith in interpretation theory as conventionally defined. The dictionary meaning
or nonlegal usage of terms like "educational," "charitable," and so forth would
be of relatively little interest to her, and-while she would surely consider
historical evidence regarding development of the charitable tax exemption-she
would be more concerned with the current state of statutory and decisional law
in the area. Public opinion (however enlightened) would likewise be less
important to her than specifically legal decisions and practice. One has the
sense that, if different perspectives conflicted, a Pattersonian judge would be
more likely to favor doctrinal or precedential considerations than would an
Eskridgian or similar actor. Indeed, a Pattersonian judge might not see the case
as a question of interpretation at all, but as a matter of reconciling nontax
precedents against racial discrimination with the special history and character
of tax practice, and doing so with the least possible damage to both areas of
law.90
A Pattersonian scholar, writing about Bob Jones University or similar
cases, would similarly have a distinctive agenda. Contemporary scholars tend
to emphasize the importance of interpretation (so-called "interpretive
universalism") and to rely extensively on literary, religious, and other nonlegal
analogies in making their arguments. 9' A Pattersonian scholar might write
less about these issues and more about the specifically legal implications of
different interpretive methods: How do judges actually decide statutory cases?
What assumptions about the legislative process, and the competence of legal
institutions, are built into this process, and are these assumptions consistent
with actual legislative practice? What is the track record of different
interpretive methods in producing convincing and long-lasting results-results
that, in Patterson's parlance, become part of the "web" of accepted belief and
practice? Is this track record consistent across legal categories, or does it vary
depending on the subject and character of the law being interpreted? These
"local" questions, rather than the latest in Biblical hermeneutics or Continental
90. In a literal sense, any resolution of Bob Jones University would involve statutory interpretation,
since a statutory provision (§ 501(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code) was at issue. A decision that
emphasized the "web" of legal beliefs and practice in the case, however, would look very different from
one that emphasized interpretation theory or the possible meanings of the statutory language. For a broader
view of the issues at stake in Bob Jones University, see Dane, supra note 82, at 44-45 (suggesting that the
Court should have considered the relationship of the Internal Revenue Code "not just to snatches of the
common law of charities, but to the full panoply of legal visions of religion and religiously-bound
institutions").
91. See sources cited supra note 67.
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philosophy, would occupy his attention, and he would tend to see statutory
interpretation as one small part of a broader legal process, rather than as a link
to an outside, nonlegal world.92
A Pattersonian scholar would, in short, take the interpretation debate back
to its origins, to the real world of laws and decisions. That might not be
altogether a bad thing. In arguing for a particular method, he would emphasize
the method's fit with other aspects of a healthy and mature legal process rather
than with assorted nonlegal doctrines, and he would spend his time reading
cases and statutes in place of philosophical treatises. Above all, he would be
modest in his ambitions, emphasizing the limited scope of his
recommendations and of legal interpretation as a whole. His true mentors
would not be the postmodern philosophers, but instead the 1950s legal process
school associated with Hart and Sacks, whose work similarly emphasized the
special nature of legal discourse and saw statutory interpretation as one part
of a broader legal process analysis.
93
IV
This "back to basics" spirit-the need to resist the allure of external
formulas and return to the essential building blocks of legal argument-is
indeed a more general theme of Law and Truth. Whether intentionally or not,
Patterson has constructed a powerful brief for a return to tradition in legal
teaching and scholarship, for a renewed emphasis on cases, statutes, and other
conventional legal materials, and for less attention to nonlegal sources. If law
is, in fact, a "first-order" argumentative practice, and if nonlegal analogies do
not clarify but instead obscure the true nature of law, then it is hard to escape
the conclusion that most contemporary jurisprudential scholars are engaged in
a dead-end pursuit. The legal academy of 1960, with its internal view of law
and legal reasoning, was at least asking the right questions; today's academy,
with its search for external validation, is not. By seeking truth everywhere
except our own backyard, we are actually getting further away from it.
The warning sounded by Patterson is an increasingly common one in the
legal academy, although rarely presented in so compelling a manner. It is
92. See PATIERSON, supra note 2, at 181-82. Patterson wntes:
[My] point of view counsels a return to the local .... And what do I mean by "the local"'
Skeptical as I am of jurisprudential projects that seek to undcrwnite the legitimacy of law by
recourse to something outside law (e.g., economics or moral philosophy). I would urge more
careful attention to the ways in which different areas of the law employ the forms of legal
argument .... A historical account of these developments is. potentially, quite interesting
Id.
93. Patterson differs from Hart and Sacks in his skepticism about legislative purpose and (what is
really the same thing) in his less idealistic view of legislation, but resembles them in his emphasis on legal
process and in stressing the relatively narrow range of interpretation as opposed to understanding of
everyday statutory language.
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present in Anthony Kronman's book, The Lost Lawyer,94 which laments the
decline of the "lawyer-statesman" and his defining trait of "practical wisdom"
and the rise of the economically motivated practitioner in the law firm and the
economics- or philosophy-driven professor in the law school.95 It is present
in bar association reports that seek to "bridge the gap" between legal teaching
and practice and to refocus the academy on legal as opposed to academic
concerns. 96 At a colloquial level, it is reflected in the complaint of countless
law students to their more theoretically minded professors: "We want to learn
the law!"
What is unusual about Patterson is that he uses the tools and language of
analytic philosophy to make a case for what is, essentially, an old-fashioned
approach to legal teaching and scholarship; he uses the philosopher's own
magic, so to speak, to prove that we do not really need the philosopher. In his
formulation, the philosopher's postmodernism and the lawyer's practical
wisdom become one: We return to law, not because we are afraid of
modernity, but because we have surpassed it, because postmodern thought
teaches us that legal truth is no better-but just as surely no worse-than any
other truth. 97 The true sophisticate, according to Patterson, is she who
disclaims sophistication, who engages in the competent and effective practice
of law without the need for outside approval or validation.
It is a beguiling concept, and one with considerable appeal to legal
scholars buffeted by a generation of nonlegal "-isms." Is it also a convincing
one? Should lawyers (and law professors) indeed "return to the local,"
abandoning the effort to justify themselves with a range of external materials?
The answer, I think, depends upon one's reading of Patterson and the uses
to which his argument is put. To the extent that Patterson makes an intellectual
case for law as a distinct argumentative practice and criticizes others for
relying on nonlegal formulas, he commands strong ground. I share his sense
that meta-theories, from Dworkin's to Fish's to Posner's, have hit diminishing
returns. There is also something refreshing about his focus on the actual
language of legal argument, both as a scholarly subject matter and as the
distinguishing feature of law. Unlike most contemporary theorists, Patterson
94. KRONMAN, supra note 7.
95. See id. at 11-52.
96. See, e.g., AMERICAN BAR ASS'N, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PROFESSIONAL DEVELOPMENT-AN
EDUCATIONAL CONTINUUM, REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE ON LAW SCHOOLS AND THE
PROFESSION-NARROWING THE GAP (Robert MacCrate ed., 1992). Here again, the issue of practical as
opposed to theoretical law teaching is distinct from the issue of traditional versus nontraditional legal
scholarship, but they share common themes and are frequently discussed in tandem by Kronman and other
authors. See, e.g., KRONMAN, supra note 7, at 165-270 (discussing teaching and scholarship in law schools).
97. See supra note 32 (discussing Patterson's use of postmodem thought to establish that law is a
social and argumentative practice having equal standing with science, philosophy, or other self-contained
disciplines). It should be noted that Patterson's use of postmodemism remains within the tradition of
analytic philosophy and differs from the work of Jacques Derrida and other linguistic theorists associated
with the postmodern label. See Dennis Patterson, Postmodernism/Feminism/Law, 77 CORNELL L. REv. 254,
313 n.276 (1992) ("In the end, Derrida is just a skeptic-Hume in the cafe.").
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does not pretend that lawyers, in practicing law, are actually doing something
else-they are doing what they seem to be doing, and the key to understanding
them is simply to listen more closely. Patterson's approach also takes
practicing lawyers and legislators seriously, while many jurisprudential theories
seem excessively focused on judges and their decisions.
Yet if Law and Truth is a convincing and even pathbreaking work, it has
some troubling implications. My worry is less with the internal structure of
Patterson's argument than with the uses to which others, especially the more
partisan traditionalists, may put it. I have three principal concerns in this area.
First, a theory of law as a linguistic or argumentative practice places a
great deal of pressure on the definition of the practice-the rules of the game,
so to speak. What counts as a prudential or, for that matter, a historical
argument? How would one account for an argument that the entire structure
of family law was suspect because of its patriarchal origins,9' or that juries
should nullify verdicts against black defendants because of the allegedly
pervasive racism of the criminal justice system?99 Would these merely be
extreme examples of acceptable discourse, or are they outside the modalities
and hence (presumably) illegitimate? What of international or choice-of-law
cases, in which the issue is the clash of competing practices and outlooks?
Patterson finesses these problems by emphasizing examples of legal arguments
(those of Eskridge, Posner, and so forth) of which he by and large approves.
But the issue of illegitimate argument must come up if the modalities are to
have any meaning, and this issue raises the specter of traditional theorists
attempting to delegitimize critical or unconventional discourse as beyond the
pale of the acceptable. The linguistic practice model similarly places great
demand on the assignment of competence: Are only trained lawyers permitted
to play the game, or is it open to qualified outsiders-and who (if anyone) is
qualified to make this judgment?' 0°
Second, and relatedly, a linguistic theory may have difficulty in accounting
for rapid, nonincremental developments in the law. If judges and scholars
always make decisions consistent with an existing "web" of outcomes and
beliefs, then why do things ever change? Why are old truths sometimes
rejected and new ones advanced in their place? In the scientific field, this
98. See, e.g., MARTHA ALBERTSON FINFMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER. THE SEXUAL FAMILY AND
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995).
99. See Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Cimnal Justice Svstem.
105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995).
100. When I presented this criticism to Patterson in person. he dismissed it a5 *less than tnvial.-
insisting that he is merely describing the nature of law and has no interest in legitmizing or delegitimizing
any particular form(s) of legal argument. While this is no doubt Patterson's intention. I remain concerned
that others will use his and Kronman's work to marginalize divergent perspectives and to uphold a more-or-
less traditional outlook on legal problems. A "'modal" view of legal argument necessarily implies that there
are arguments outside the modalities and places great power in the hands of those in a position to determine
what they might be. On the implicit political content of practical reason scholarship. see Jay M. Fcmman.
Practical Legal Studies and Critical Legal Studies. 87 MICH. L. REv. 724 (1988) (correspondence)
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question has been addressed by Thomas Kuhn's theory of scientific
revolutions, in which paradigms shift and a new web is constructed on the
remains of the old.'0' Patterson does not address the equivalent issue for law,
and it remains largely beyond the scope of his book. But it would be
interesting to see him deal with, say, the decision in Brown v. Board of
Education,10 2 or the decline of substantive due process in the late 1930s,'0 3
or rapid legislative change like the New Deal or the Tax Reform Act of
1986."° It is, of course, possible to squeeze such events into an incremental
framework; the Brown decision may be seen as resolving a contradiction
between exclusionary racial policies and a broader framework of inclusion and
equality, or the Tax Reform Act as bringing tax law closer to its originally
intended goals. But these descriptions appear somewhat stretched, and there do
seem to be times in which the normal rules cease to apply and in which the
boundary between legal and nonlegal discourse is more readily crossed. It
would be useful to have an account of these instances.
Finally, I am concerned that Patterson's approach, and the revival of
practical reason generally, could cause an excessive conservatism in legal
scholarship, discouraging scholars from using even appropriate nonlegal
materials and from addressing many potentially interesting questions. Even if
the great majority of law consists of nonreflective linguistic practice, it is the
occasional exception to this rule that is likely to prove the most interesting.
Similarly, while social science and philosophy may be irrelevant for most legal
issues, they are likely to matter most precisely when the issues-e.g., racial
discrimination, abortion, international human rights-are the weightiest and
most controversial. Put differently, while the need to look to external
considerations may be exceptional in everyday legal practice, at the frontiers
of legal inquiry these considerations will continue to be regular fare. 05 As
a corrective to "law and" excesses, practical reason is welcome, but it must not
be permitted to crowd out other scholarly approaches.
What these criticisms suggest is that Law and Truth is not so much a
flawed book as an incomplete one. Its impact thus depends largely on how
others use it and on how Patterson follows up on his own work. If Patterson
101. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS (1962). The problem of
discontinuous legal change is especially acute for legislation, which may not be subject to the same
standards of coherence or precedence as judicial decisions; indeed, the question arises whether "truth" is
a relevant value for the category of legislation, and if so what truth it should be. See Jill E. Fisch,
Retroactivity and Legal Change: An Equilibrium Approach, I10 HARV. L. REV. 1055 (1997); see also
William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gaylegal Narratives, 46 STAN L. REV. 607 (1994) (assessing the role of narrative
or "story-telling" in promoting new perceptions that result in legal change).
102. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
103. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTITTONAL LAW §§ 8-5 to -6 (2d ed. 1988) (analyzing
the demise of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1908)).
104. Pub. L. No. 99-514, 100 Stat. 2085 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26 U.S.C.).
105. Cf. Posner, supra note 7, at 1653-54 ("In a period of change, systemic questions become more
interesting, more urgent, than doctrinal ones.... [L]egal reasoning is, essentially, debaters' reasoning; and
debaters' reasoning will not resolve fundamental clashes of value or difficult empirical questions.").
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can offer a more complete account of law as an argumentative practice, and
if he and others are able to apply his work to specific areas of law-including
those that involve radical or at least more controversial examples of legal
change-then he will have written one of the major jurisprudential works of
his generation. If these efforts are not undertaken and the book is used largely
as an excuse to do what traditionalists were already doing anyway, its effect
will be far less salubrious. On this last point, I am guardedly optimistic;
nevertheless, the outcome remains to be seen.
It may be that the nature of truth, like the existence of God, is beyond the
capacity of human beings to prove or disprove. The more relevant, or at least
more immediate, question then becomes the effect of the belief on the
believers. What do they do differently from others who share different beliefs?
Are they better-as people, lawyers, or scholars-than they would otherwise
be? Dennis Patterson has made a powerful case that the prevailing beliefs in
contemporary jurisprudence are misguided, that they are leading us down the
wrong paths. By linking postmodernism with practical reason, he has made
himself both a traditionalist and a futurist critic of the existing jurisprudential
order. It is an intellectual tour de force, but one that will ultimately be judged
by its effects. If Patterson and his compatriots can produce a "local"
scholarship that adds to our understanding of law more than the scholarship of
Dworkin, Fish, and other universal theorists, the effort will surely have been
worth it. If not, he is destined to be another engaging, but ultimately false,
prophet. By their fruits will ye know them.
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